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Abstract
This paper provides evidence on the impact of European Banking Union (BU) and the asso-
ciated Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on the risk disclosure practices of European 
banks. The onset of BU and the associated rules are considered as an exogenous shock that 
provides the setting for a natural experiment to analyze the effects of the new supervisory 
arrangements on bank risk disclosure practices. A Difference-in-Differences approach is 
adopted, building evidence from the disclosure practices of systemically important banks 
supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) and other banks supervised by national 
regulators over the period 2012–2017. The main findings are that bank risk disclosure 
increased overall following BU but there was a weakening of disclosure by SSM-super-
vised banks relative to banks supervised by national authorities. We also find that the over-
all positive effect of the BU on bank disclosure is stronger for less profitable banks and in 
the most troubled economies of the Eurozone (GIPSI countries), while the negative effect 
on centrally supervised banks is stronger if bank CEOs act also as chairmen (CEO duality). 
We interpret these findings in light of the fact that the new institutional arrangements for 
bank supervision under which the ECB relies on local supervisors to collect the informa-
tion necessary to act gives rise to inefficiencies with respect to the speed and completeness 
of the information flow between SSM supervised banks and the ECB, which are reflected 
in bank disclosure practices.
Keywords Risk disclosure · Banks · Banking union · Single supervisory mechanism · 
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1 Introduction
This paper aims to investigate the effects that the change in banking supervision and the 
associated rules of the Banking Union (BU) in Europe has had on the disclosure practices 
of banks. Banks are notoriously opaque because of their risk-taking and maturity transfor-
mation role, which makes them difficult to assess without considerable information on their 
financial position and risk-taking practices (Morgan 2002; Flannery et  al. 2013). If risk 
disclosure is adequate, it can serve as an outside mechanism for monitoring the behavior 
of senior management (Eng and Mak 2003) and facilitate access to external finance at a 
reasonable cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Easley and O’Hara 
2004; Cheng et al. 2006; Zhang and Ding 2006; Eaton et al. 2007; Kothari et al. 2009). 
However, voluntary risk disclosures are not always optimal for several reasons. First, dis-
closures are costly and banks weigh the costs against the potential benefit of lower fund-
ing costs when deciding on the quality, level and frequency of disclosures. Second, banks 
have considerable discretion in deciding on the information to be disclosed, which also 
means that voluntary disclosures may not necessarily generate optimal outcomes. Lands-
man (2006) notes that banks may be able to affect disclosure content through the timing of 
earnings announcements and balance sheet adjustments. Gunther and Moore (2003) show 
that US banks in poorer financial condition are more likely to understate financial losses. 
Finally, even if risk disclosure is optimal, the regulatory architecture may mitigate against 
regulators taking the appropriate action. For example, the literature shows that supervi-
sors have diverging interests when the discharge of supervisory duties affects economies 
asymmetrically. This may be the case, for example, when the affiliates of a cross-border 
banking group are of diverging importance for their respective national financial markets 
(e.g., Holthausen and Rønde 2004; Bolton and Oehmke 2016). In the context of European 
BU, the potentially diverging interests of supervisors could have important implications 
as they could result in suboptimal information sharing and cooperation between the Euro-
pean Central Bank and the national bank regulators (see, for example, Carletti, et al. 2015, 
2021).
Supervision and bank disclosure are closely related. The existing literature provides evi-
dence that bank supervision has a strong impact on bank disclosure (Barakat and Hus-
sainey 2013; Mester 2017; Costello et al. 2018). Bank supervisory authorities are essential 
to maintain the integrity and transparency of the whole banking sector. Furthermore, bank 
disclosure is extremely beneficial for supervisors. Nier and Baumann (2006) show that 
more transparency decreases equity return volatility, and consequently improve supervi-
sors’ view of the risk and relative performance of the bank. Higher levels of transparency 
can also supplement conventional supervisory tools, as the increasing complexity of large 
financial institutions makes them difficult to control using traditional monitoring tech-
niques (Flannery 2001).
Bank opacity and inadequate risk disclosure have been cited as an important factor con-
tributing to the financial crisis (Avgouleas 2009; Gorton 2009; Sowerbutts et al. 2013) in 
that banks did not report enough information about the risks that they were exposed to. The 
lack of disclosure by banks magnified uncertainty about the underlying value of assets and 
off-balance sheet exposures to structured credit products, which led to considerable reluc-
tance by counterparties to trade and further fueled the market turmoil. Gorton and Ordoñez 
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(2014) show how opacity can prevent market participants from distinguishing high-risk 
from low-risk institutions, with market participants supplying funds to both healthy and 
unsound banks on similar terms and conditions. These information problems can increase 
financial fragility.
In response to the financial crisis, financial regulators in major jurisdictions have taken 
several steps aimed at increasing bank risk disclosures to reduce the likelihood and severity 
of future crises and promote financial stability. In the European Union (EU), the risk dis-
closure practices of European banks had been largely harmonized by the requirement that 
banks (and other firms) report according to International Financial Reporting Standards 
beginning in 2005. Following the crisis, three further reforms were introduced. First, in 
2014 Basel III Pillar 3 disclosures requirements were introduced into EU law through the 
Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV), which introduced standardized regulatory 
reporting by specifying the information firms must report to supervisors in areas such as 
own funds, large exposures and financial information.1 Second, the European BU project 
began to be implemented from late 2014 after the fragmented system of national supervi-
sion and bank resolution was viewed as having been characterized by regulators pursuing 
domestic objectives that exacerbated systemic risk (Draghi 2018). A key pillar of BU is the 
two-tier single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for banks. The SSM regulation comprises 
an institutional architecture that sees the European Central Bank (ECB) as the suprana-
tional hub at the center of the supervisory network that also assigns important supervisory 
functions to the national regulator spokes (National Competent Authorities, NCAs). At the 
hub, banks deemed “significant” are supervised directly by the ECB, though on the basis 
of information reported by banks to their national regulator and subsequently passed on to 
the ECB.2 The supervision of significant banks includes the ECB conducting stress tests on 
banks and subjecting them to capital or risk limits and changes in management if problems 
are found.3In the spokes, smaller banks continue to be directly monitored and supervised 
by their national authorities. The effective functioning of the SSM therefore hinges criti-
cally on making the interfaces within the SSM work smoothly and, in particular, on exten-
sive information sharing and cooperation between the ECB and NCAs. The third reform, 
was the introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II in 2018, which 
imposed more reporting requirements on all EU banks.
The BU and the new disclosure rules were expected to facilitate closer monitoring of 
banks by regulators and other stakeholders thereby subjecting bank managers to greater 
discipline and making the financial system more stable. A central supervisory authority 
would concern itself with stability and welfare at systemic-wide level, above any specific 
local interests, whereas local supervisors would have specific interests pertaining to the 
geographic area under their supervision that might be detrimental for the systemic-wide 
financial stability (Draghi 2018). However, the reliance of the ECB on national regulators 
1 The reform has also embraced subsequent revisions to the disclosure requirements aimed at addressing 
perceived shortcomings in Pillar 3. In this regard, it is important to notice that 2014 Basel III Pillar 3 dis-
closures requirements have had an important impact on the disclosure provided by European banks, but 
exclusively in the Pillar 3 disclosure report, which is provided separately from the annual financial reports 
(Scannella and Polizzi 2021).
2 See Tröger (2014) for a detailed description of the division of labor between the ECB and the NCAs in 
the SSM.
3 A bank was deemed significant if: assets exceeding €30 billion; assets exceeded both €5 billion and 20% 
of the GDP of the member state in which it is located; it was among the three most significant banks of the 
country in which it is located; it had large cross-border activities; and it bank received, or had applied for, 
assistance from euro-zone bailout funds.
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to pass-on information reported by significant banks has raised doubts about the legiti-
macy of the ECB’s supervisory role. As Carletti et al. (2021) note, an institutional design 
in which a centralized agency has full power over all decisions regarding banks but relies 
on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act entails a principal-agent 
problem between the central and local supervisors if their objective functions differ. As a 
result of different objective functions, information collection may be inferior to that under 
either fully independent local supervisors or under centralized information collection and 
may increase risk-taking by regulated banks. Thus, whether a “tougher” central supervi-
sor—the ECB—would result in more optimal bank disclosure is an open question.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of BU (and the SSM in particular) and the associ-
ated Pillar 3 disclosure rules on the risk disclosure activities of EU banks. We treat the onset 
of BU as an exogenous shock that provides the setting for a natural experiment to analyze the 
effects of the new supervisory arrangements on bank risk disclosure practices. To this end, 
we use content analysis techniques and construct an expert-validated dictionary to analyze 
bank annual reports and exploit the introduction of BU and the new rules. We then employ 
Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimation where banks subject to the SSM act as the treat-
ment group and banks that remain subject to supervision by the national authority act as the 
control group. We test two hypotheses in our analysis. The first hypothesis is that the onset 
of BU resulted in an overall increase in risk disclosure by European banks (‘significant’ or 
otherwise). The second hypothesis is that the additional requirements of the SSM decreased 
risk disclosure by SSM supervised banks (treated entities) relative to that by other banks. To 
preview the main findings, we find support for the first hypothesis in that risk disclosure by 
all banks appears to have increased in a number of key categories following the onset of BU 
and the new disclosure rules. Our results also support the second hypothesis as risk disclosure 
by SSM supervised banks appears to have worsened in comparison to nationally supervised 
banks, despite the increase in disclosure overall. We attribute this second finding to ineffi-
ciencies associated with the two-tier supervisory mechanism under BU, which are reflected 
in bank risk disclosure. In order to solve these problems, we suggest that the BU be reformed 
such that SSM supervised banks report directly to the ECB rather than the present arrange-
ment whereby the ECB relies on national regulators for information on these banks. In an 
additional analysis, we also find that the overall positive effect of the BU on bank disclosure is 
stronger for less profitable banks and in the most troubled economies of the Eurozone (GIPSI 
countries), while the negative effect on SSM supervised banks is stronger in banks where the 
CEO is also the chairman (CEO duality).
Our study is motivated by the importance of understanding the effects of the new banking 
supervision structure in Europe on bank disclosure practices. Although the extant literature 
has shown that banking supervision and disclosure are tightly related, to the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first study to examine the effects on risk disclosure of the European BU and 
the associated SSM.
The main contribution of the paper is to extend the limited empirical literature on the 
effects of BU on bank behavior. Studies of this type to date have focused on the impact on 
equity prices, credit contagion, market credibility, and public finance implications. We believe 
that this is the first empirical study on the impact of BU on bank risk disclosure practices. 
Second, we contribute to the discussion on the effects of bank supervision on bank disclosure 
practices. More generally, our study extends the limited European banking literature employ-
ing content analysis of annual reports.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section  2 describes the theoretical 
framework and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 reviews the related literature on 
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risk disclosure. Section 4 discusses the methodology, identification strategy, and data. Sec-
tion 5 reports the empirical results and Sect. 6 concludes.
2  Theoretical framework and research hypotheses
The literature offers various theoretical frameworks to explain the effect of banking super-
vision on bank disclosure practices, and their analysis is important to understand the 
impact of the BU on bank risk disclosure. In our research setting, we draw upon: (i) the 
organization society theories (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Cho et al. 2015; Cohen et al. 
2017) that shed light into the effects of banking supervision on bank disclosure; and (ii) 
the theories that analyze the effectiveness of the banking supervision in a multi-supervisor 
setting (Agarwal et al. 2014; Carletti et al. 2021), which provide an explanation on whether 
or not the supervisory function performed by the SSM is more effective than that of the 
NCAs.
The organization-society theories (which include stakeholder theory, resource depend-
ence theory and legitimacy theory) (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Cho et al. 2015; Cohen 
et al. 2017) represent a fundamental theoretical framework to explain the role that bank-
ing supervisors play in shaping bank disclosure practices (Barakat and Hussainey 2013). 
These theories posit that banking supervisory authorities that are fully informed and able 
to promptly and precisely take corrective actions, are effective and influential in motivating 
bank managers to provide comprehensive disclosure. There are two main conditions essen-
tial for supervisors to carry out their supervisory activities effectively: (i) the capability of 
taking corrective actions to promote changes, and; (ii) the speed and precision of taking 
these decisions. While both local and central supervisors should be capable of taking cor-
rective action, when it comes to the speed and precision of deciding how to behave, there 
is a substantial difference between them. Given that the current design of the supervisory 
mechanism requires NCAs to act as information collector on behalf of the SSM, the central 
supervisor may not be able to promptly take supervisory corrective actions. This indirect 
and hence slower flow of information may also result in an information loss for the ulti-
mate supervisor. In addition, given that NCAs have been the sole supervisors until 2014, 
they may be more precise in taking the right corrective actions, as they can rely also on a 
more complete set of soft information about the entities they supervise. For these reasons, 
the central supervisor would be in no position to fulfil its role effectively. On closer inspec-
tion, the legitimacy theory (O’Donovan 2002; Cho and Patten 2007; Cho et al. 2015) posits 
that firms in general and bank in particular may comply with disclosure requirements, in 
order to confirm and show their full adherence to the institutional values of the society 
(i.e. to gain institutional legitimacy). The resource dependence theory (Boyd 1990; Cohen 
et al. 2017) postulates that organization survival and growth depends on some important 
resources that are available in the external environment. Thus, firms compete with each 
other in order to control these resources. In Europe, the supervisory authorities can grant 
and withdraw banking licenses.4 The license for the banking activity is a crucial resource 
for financial institutions and banks can use disclosure as a means to convince the supervi-
sor that the bank continues to merit a license. The stakeholder theory (Bowen et al. 1995; 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997) posits that stakeholders have various expectations and influ-
ence on the firm. Thus, banks may want to provide an effective disclosure to interact and 
4 https:// www. banki ngsup ervis ion. europa. eu/ banki ng/ tasks/ autho risat ion/ html/ index. en. html.
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communicate more effectively with the most influential stakeholders, of which the super-
visor is amongst the most important. However, if the central supervisor is not capable of 
quickly and precisely taking corrective actions, its monitoring function may not be suf-
ficiently effective. A slow, imprecise and not fully informed supranational supervisor may 
not be able to achieve a high level of institutional legitimacy, show that it controls valuable 
resources for financial institutions, and that it is an influential stakeholder. In our research 
setting, given that the SSM still has to rely on the information provided by the NCAs, it 
may be less informed, slower and less precise, resulting in an inefficient supervisory func-
tion. This inefficiency will be reflected also in bank disclosure, resulting in a less compre-
hensive disclosure for SSM supervised banks in comparison to the financial institutions 
monitored by national supervisors, after the establishment of the BU.
Given that the current supervisory system in Europe requires the cooperation of national 
and supranational supervisors, the theories that study the effectiveness of banking super-
vision in a multi-supervisor setting represent an important point of reference for our 
research setting (Agarwal et al. 2014; Carletti et al. 2021). Agarwal et al. (2014) analyze 
the supervisory decisions of US bank regulators, exploiting a legally determined rotation 
policy, which assigns state or federal supervisors to the same financial institution at pre-
determined time periods. The authors show that different supervisors implement the same 
rules inconsistently, due to differences in their utility functions. More specifically, local 
supervisors carry out their activities in a softer way during stressed economic conditions, 
because tough supervision might increase the likelihood of bank failures and lead to a loss 
of local lending activity and banking employment. In contrast, federal supervisors are more 
concerned about systemic stability at supranational level, rather than about the geographi-
cal distribution of banking credit supply and employment. According to this ‘local interest 
hypothesis’, a central supervisor should perform better than local supervisors, as they do 
not have specific interests in favour of large banks at local level. In contrast, local supervi-
sors have specific interests on the geographic area under their supervision. Furthermore, 
local supervisors compete with each other. For instance, they may want to attract banks 
from closer geographical areas or avoid that their local banks move elsewhere. In order 
to do so, they could perform a less demanding supervisory function. This circumstance 
may give financial institutions the chance to exploit a regulatory arbitrage from different 
jurisdictions. The findings of Agarwal et al. (2014) are crucial to understand the trade-offs 
related to the distribution of supervisory responsibility and powers across different authori-
ties. The authors themselves argue that their findings should be taken into consideration for 
the debate concerning the redesign of European bank supervisory system. Although NCAs 
might have an informational advantage, their utility functions are crucial in determining 
the efficacy of the supervisory mechanism. In particular, NCAs may want to be softer with 
distressed banks, if they are too big to fail for their national economy. However, from a 
theoretical perspective, there are various reasons why the current European supervisory 
system may not work fully effectively. NCAs still have room to influence the supervisory 
process carried out by the SSM, given that the latter still relies on the information provided 
by the former in order to perform its supervisory function. Consequently, these diverging 
interests between national and central supervisors may result in a lack of effectiveness of 
the supervisory mechanism. The conflicting utility functions and objectives of the local 
supervisors may still result in an insufficient effectiveness of the SSM, as long as NCAs 
can strongly interfere in the supervisory process. Hence, the SSM may be in no position to 
fulfil its supervisory function effectively. In light of the postulates of the aforementioned 
organization society theories, this lack of effectiveness may be reflected in the disclosure 
provided by the banks under SSM supervision.
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Carletti et  al. (2021) study the behaviour of supervisors in the so called ‘hub-and-
spokes’ regime: where a central supervisor has juridical power over all decisions concern-
ing financial institutions, but it relies upon local supervisors in order to collect the informa-
tion it needs to take the necessary corrective actions. This institutional structure entails a 
double principal agent problem, between the bank and its supervisor, and between the local 
and the central supervisor. The latter is a serious issue, because the two supervisors have 
different utility functions and final objectives. In this situation, the scale of information col-
lection of local supervisors will not only be inferior to that of a central supervisor, which 
directly collects all information, but also to that of independent local supervisors, which 
remains inferior to the central supervisor model. The reason behind this suboptimal level 
of information collection lies on the fact that local supervisors prefer to remain ignorant, 
rather than learning information that could lead the central supervisory authority to actions 
that are against their interests. This, in turn, leads to an inefficient supervisory system and 
to a less sound banking sector. The authors themselves state that their theoretical frame-
work is inspired by the current supervisory design in Europe. This model suggests that 
unless the spokes (NCAs) and the hub (the ECB) act jointly with the same objectives, the 
effectiveness of the whole supervisory system will be compromised, suggesting that the 
current supervisory structure in Europe is far from being able to solve the problems of 
the fragmentation of bank monitoring activity. In conclusion, in our research setting, this 
model would predict a worsening in the supervisory function, and, consequently, a less 
comprehensive bank disclosure for SSM supervised financial institutions after the estab-
lishment of the BU. In addition, the European Directive 2013/36 and the Regulation (EU) 
N. 575/2013 prescribe several national options and discretions that can be applied on the 
basis of certain national circumstances.5
However, there should not be any fear of regulatory and supervisory inconsistency for 
the financial institutions that are still supervised by the NCAs. These financial institutions 
are not affected by the aforementioned ‘hub-and-spokes’ regime, as they are supervised by 
national authorities. Furthermore, after the establishment of the BU, an important mes-
sage has been sent to the entire banking system: banking supervision and risk disclosure 
have become a priority at national and international level. Hence, our expectation is that 
there may be an overall improvement in the supervisory system across Europe, after the 
establishment of the BU. In addition, after the BU in 2014, the workload of the local super-
visory authorities has decreased, as NCAs are no longer responsible for the supervision of 
the largest financial institutions. Hence, they have more time and resources to monitor the 
other financial institutions. Based on these considerations and theories, our first research 
hypothesis is the following:
Hypothesis 1 Overall, the banking system has improved its risk disclosure after the BU.
In contrast, according to the aforementioned theories, the establishment of the BU may 
result in less comprehensive disclosure specifically for SSM supervised banks, in compari-
son to NCA monitored financial institutions, because of the aforementioned problems of 
the ‘hub-and-spokes’ regime. Furthermore, given that the European Directive 2013/36 and 
the Regulation (EU) N. 575/2013 prescribe several national options and discretions, there 
might be a fear of regulatory and supervisory inconsistencies for the financial institutions 
supervised by the SSM (Carboni et  al. 2017). This would support the idea that flexible, 
5 See Regulation (EU) N. 575/2013, Article 400(2)(c) for further information.
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well informed and quick local supervisors are better than a slow, less informed and poten-
tially inconsistent central supervisor. Hence, we develop our second research hypothesis as 
follows:
Hypothesis 2 The banks supervised by the SSM have worsened their risk disclosure in 
comparison to NCA monitored financial institutions after the establishment of the BU.
Both of our research hypotheses are related to the theoretical perspectives proposed by 
the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), which represents a suitable framework to 
analyze the relationships between national and supranational banking authorities within 
the BU (Nielsen and Smeets 2018; Carletti et  al. 2021), and bank disclosure behaviour 
(Barakat and Hussainey 2013; Al-Hadi et  al. 2016). For example, Nielsen and Smeets 
(2018) analyze the role of EU and national institutions in guiding the reform process of 
the European Monetary Union. These authors rely on the principal-agent theory to explain 
how these authorities have cooperated to set up the BU. In contrast, with reference to bank 
disclosure, Al-Hadi et al. (2016) analyze the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on bank disclosures under the lenses of the agency theory. In particular, the agency theory 
posits that increased managerial monitoring is positively associated with risk disclosure 
and bank transparency.
3  Evidence on the determinants of risk disclosure
Failures in bank-risk disclosure emerged as a troublesome feature of the financial crisis. 
Sowerbutts et  al. (2013, p. 327) state that “In plain terms, banks did not report enough 
information about the assets they were holding or the risks that they were exposed to.” Pub-
lishing better information could reduce the probability of future financial crises by making 
supervision more effective and sudden changes in sentiment of outsider stakeholders less 
likely. The relevant empirical literature has several strands and much of it relies on content 
analysis of annual reports and financial statements and relates to non-financial institutions.6 
One set of studies examines how firm-specific characteristics impact risk-disclosure. For 
example, Abraham and Cox (2007) find that risk reporting in the annual reports of US 
corporates is positively related to governance (larger board size and a higher proportion of 
independent directors) and negatively related to the proportion of institutional share owner-
ship. Linsley and Shrives (2006) report that in a sample of 79 UK company annual reports 
larger firms with greater environmental risk have higher risk disclosures. Finally, Helbok 
and Wagner (2006) find that disclosure of operational risk is higher in banks with lower 
capital-asset and profitability ratios in a sample of 142 banks from North America, Asia, 
and Europe.
A second set of studies focuses on firms’ incentives to disclose risk (Nissim 2003). 
For example, Ball et al. (2003) examine the interaction between accounting standards and 
the incentives of managers and auditors in East Asian countries whose standards derive 
from common law sources that are widely viewed as being of a higher quality than code 
law standards. They show that financial reporting quality is not higher than under code 
law and attribute differences to the low quality of report preparers. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) find that market demand for information results in UK private company financial 
6 See, for example, Weber (1990) and Krippendorff (2004) for discussions of content analysis.
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reporting being of a lower quality than that for public companies, even though both types 
face broadly equivalent regulations. Miihkinen (2012) finds that firm size, profitability, 
and foreign listing status were important determinants of disclosure in a sample of listed 
Finnish firms. Finally, Goncharenko et al. (2018) present a model of the effect of informa-
tion disclosure on banks’ portfolio risk and show that information disclosure lowers the 
expected risk-adjusted profits for banks, especially for systemically important institutions.
Studies specifically on the impact of regulatory changes on firms’ risk disclosure prac-
tices are quite rare. Woods et al. (2008) find that the increasing adoption of international 
accounting standards and global convergence of accounting regulations has done little to 
reduce the diversity of market risk disclosure practices at international and European level. 
Barakat and Hussainey (2013) report that powerful and independent bank supervisors 
mitigate the incentives for entrenched bank executives to withhold voluntary disclosure. 
Barakat and Hussainey’s (2013) work belongs to a developed strand of literature that ana-
lyzes the relationship between bank supervision and bank disclosure practices and level of 
transparency (Mester 2017; Costello et  al. 2018). This stream of literature provides evi-
dence that bank supervisory authorities are essential to maintain the integrity and trans-
parency of the whole banking sector. Higher levels of transparency can also supplement 
conventional supervisory tools, as the increasing complexity of large financial institutions 
makes them difficult to control using traditional monitoring techniques (Flannery 2001). 
Burks et al. (2018) use the relaxation of interstate branching restrictions in the US to exam-
ine how increases in competition affected voluntary disclosure through press releases. 
They report that more competition is associated with an increase in press releases that 
become more negative in tone as entry barriers decrease, and that disclosures by public 
banks and by banks issuing equity become incrementally positive in tone when entry bar-
riers decrease. They interpret this as the increase in disclosure being aimed at deterring 
entry via negative information, which is mitigated by an incentive to communicate positive 
information to investors. Finally, Kleymenova and Zhang (2019) investigate how the Dodd-
Frank Act (DFA) affected voluntary disclosures of large bank holding companies relative 
to other banks and unregulated firms in the financial sector. Using a difference-in-differ-
ences research design, they find that following the introduction of the DFA, large banks 
become less likely to issue earnings forecasts containing bad news, reduce the frequency of 
issuing earnings forecasts but increase the frequency of providing forecasts for dividends 
and return on assets; in addition, large banks provided less information than other banks on 
regulated activities and instead focused on financial performance and market innovation.
Empirical literature specifically on the effects of Banking Union is especially scarce. 
To date, there have been studies of the impact of BU on bank credit risk (Avignone et al. 
2020), on the equity prices of banks to be subjected to the SSM mechanism (Carboni et al. 
2017; Sahin and de Haan 2016), on bank and sovereign credit contagion (Sáiz et al. 2019), 
and on the market credibility (Pancotto, 2019), systemic implications (Hüser et al. 2017), 
and public finance aspects (Benczur et al. 2017) of the BU’s bank resolution regime. As 
far as we are aware, there are no empirical studies of the impact of BU and the SSM on the 
risk disclosure practices of European banks.
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4  Methodology and data
4.1  Dependent variable
There is substantial evidence that content analysis techniques are trustworthy tools to 
extract valuable information from financial reports (Li 2010; Brown and Tucker 2011; 
Bushman et  al. 2016; Andrés et  al., 2021). To investigate bank disclosure practices, we 
create a tailored dictionary designed to analyze bank reports and financial statements, as 
applying standardized dictionaries outside the context for which they were created might 
invalidate the analysis (Loughran and McDonald 2011; Beattie 2014; Kearney and Liu 
2014). We create the dictionary by selecting the most relevant words to test our research 
hypotheses by drawing on a selection of specialized banking and finance dictionaries7 
(Fitch 2018; Rutherford 2013; Shim and Constas 2016; Law and Smullen 2018). The dic-
tionary has been subsequently validated by a panel of experts from the ECB and the aca-
demia that were asked to suggest additional words, eliminate those that were not consid-
ered relevant and provide suggestions on the categorization.8 The procedure resulted in 
a dictionary of 125 words, aggregated into four different categories, which are shown in 
Table 1. The category “risk management disclosure” consists of terms that financial insti-
tutions are supposed to use to describe the risk management, monitoring, and measurement 
procedures and functions they adopt for the wide range of risks they are exposed to. The 
category “risk exposure disclosure” comprises the words that provide information related 
to the vulnerability of the bank to these risks.9 The category “references to the regulatory 
framework” is a list of terms that identify the most important regulatory and supervisory 
authorities that influence European banks’ activities at the international level. The category 
“reassuring disclosure” consists of terms that financial institutions may want to use to reas-
sure stakeholders about the bank’s financial position, performance and risk exposure.
For each category of words, we created a disclosure index (DI) computed as the stand-
ardized mean of the relative occurrences of each word belonging to the category,10 divided 
by the total number of words of the entire document, as suggested by previous disclosure 
studies (Tetlock et al. 2008; Bushman et al. 2016). Formally:
in which: mowCat k is the mean of the relative occurrences of the words belonging to 
the generic category k, and  and  are respectively the mean and the standard deviation.11 
(1)DICatk =
mowCatk − Cat k
Catk
9 The first two categories represent different aspects of the same risk disclosure concepts.
10 The count of the occurrences includes stemmed words. Hence, we count the number of times these 
stemmed words appear in the annual report.
11 The standardization may be necessary if our disclosure index is non-stationary, which might happen in 
case there are regime changes in the word distribution (Tetlock et al. 2008). Because of this standardization, 
the mean and the standard deviation of the disclosure indexes are zero and one, respectively.
7 Although other disclosure indexes based on qualitative content analysis methodologies have been pro-
posed in the literature (Scannella and Polizzi 2018, 2020), they are not suited to the analysis of large sam-
ples. In addition, more sophisticated co-occurrence analyses (Illia et al., 2014) are not suited to our research 
questions. Hence, we rely on a quantitative content analysis methodologies based on disclosure dictionaries.
8 We gratefully thank Giuseppe Avignone, Alessio Reghezza and Laura Santucci for the validation of the 
dictionary.
European Banking Union and bank risk disclosure: the effects…
1 3
These disclosure indices represent the dependent variables of our econometric models. 
More specifically, mowCatk is defined as:
Table 1  Disclosure categories for content analysis of annual reports
This table is an expert-validated tailored dictionary designed to analyze bank annual reports drawing from 
a selection of specialized banking and finance dictionaries (Fitch 2018; Rutherford 2013; Shim and Constas 
2016; Law and Smullen 2018)
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in which n is the number of words belonging to the category k.
4.2  Econometric methodology
To study the effects of BU and the SSM on bank risk disclosure, we employ a difference-
in-differences (DiD) methodology.12 Formally, for each disclosure index, we estimate the 
following model:
in which: DICatkijt is the disclosure index of the category k for bank i in country j at time 
t; BU is the enactment date of Banking Union. It is equal to one after 2014 and zero other-
wise. Treat equals zero for the control group (i.e., non-systemically important banks) and 
one for the treatment group (i.e., significant banks).  0 is the expected level of disclosure 
when all dependent variables are equal to zero. 1 captures any change in disclosure in both 
groups following the onset of BU. 2 captures disclosure differences between the treatment 
and control groups before BU. 3 represents the main coefficient of interest because it cap-
tures the effect of BU on the treatment group. More specifically, it measures the difference 
in disclosure from the pre-treatment to the post-treatment period between SSM supervised 
banks relative to banks supervised by the national regulator. A positive (negative) statisti-
cally significant sign for 3 would imply ceteris paribus that disclosure increases (reduces) 
more for SSM-supervised banks than for banks supervised by the national regulator.
Of the other components of the model, Con is a vector of bank- and country-specific 
controls widely used in the banking literature (Richardson and Welker 2001; Linsley et al. 
2006; Chen and Vashishtha 2017) to detect cross-bank heterogeneity that could affect bank 
disclosure independently of the establishment of the BU, and CFD represents country 
fixed effects to control for country heterogeneity. The bank-specific controls are: the ratio 
of equity to total assets (ETA) as measure of bank capital; the return on assets (ROA) as a 
measure of bank profitability; the ratio of loans to assets (LOANS) to capture credit struc-
ture; the ratio of off-balance sheet assets to total assets (OBS) to capture off-balance sheet 
exposure; the ratio of customer deposits to total liabilities (CUST) to capture funding struc-
ture; and the dummy variable (BIG4D) equal to unity for banks whose financial statement 
is audited by one of the big four audit firms and zero otherwise. The country level con-
trols are: the World Bank’s business disclosure index (WBBDI) to control for the potential 
effects of different regulatory frameworks for financial disclosure at country level; and a 
dummy variable (NSAD) equal to unity for the countries that have more than one national 
supervisor and zero otherwise to capture potential diverging interests between different 





(number of occurences word i)∕n
Total number of words of the annual report




+ Con + CFE + ijt
12 The DiD approach has been widely adopted in banking and accounting studies (e.g., Barth and Israeli 
2013; Berger et al. 2014; Fiordelisi et al. 2017).
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4.3  Data
The word category variables were obtained by counting the number of occurrences of the 
words of our tailored dictionary in bank annual reports. The annual reports were collected 
manually from each bank’s official website with the websites identified using the Orbis 
Bank Focus (Bureau van Dijk) database. The World Bank’s Business Extent of Disclosure 
Indexes were collected from the World Bank “Doing Business” database.
The bank sample consists of 75 SSM-supervised significant banks (the treatment 
group) and 150 other large but less important European financial institutions supervised 
by national regulators (the control group). More specifically, given that size is the most 
important parameter taken into account by the ECB to decide upon the systemically impor-
tance of the banks of the sample, we selected the largest nationally supervised entities that 
provide an audited and English version of their annual report.13 Balance sheet and perfor-
mance data covering the period 2011–2017 are from the Orbis Bank Focus database with 
the balance sheet variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to avoid the influence of 
outliers. For both groups of banks, we excluded those banks that did not provide documen-
tation for all years, and that did not provide audited and English versions of their consoli-
dated annual financial reports. The treatment and control groups both comprise large banks 
that are important at the national level and all banks in the control group are of a size that 
they are potentially subject to the supervision of the SSM if they were to grow in size either 
organically or by merging with other financial institutions. The geographical distribution of 
the banks in the sample is shown in Table 2. The final sample period is 2012–2017, which 
includes 3 years before the introduction of the BU and 3 years after its onset. The period is 
intentionally short as the change in the treatment group should be concentrated around the 
onset of the treatment (Bertrand et al. 2004). As we are specifically interested in assessing 
the impact of the BU, the choice of this time period enhances the validity of our analysis. 
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables are provided in Table 3. We tested the control 
variables for multicollinearity problems through the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), which 
provided an average VIF of 1.14 suggesting that our control variables are not highly cor-
related. The correlation matrix is provided in Table 4. The regressions were estimated with 
bank-level clusters, allowing for correlation in the error term (Petersen 2009) and robust 
standard errors to control for dependence and heteroscedasticity (White 1980).
5  Empirical results
5.1  Baseline results
Table  5 shows the results of the empirical analysis from estimating Eq.  (3) for the four 
bank disclosure categories. For each category of disclosure, the coefficient of the BU onset 
13 For additional information on the significance criteria adopted by the ECB see: https:// www. banki ngsup 
ervis ion. europa. eu/ banki ng/ list/ crite ria/ html/ index. en. html.
 The SIFI and the less significant institutions of our sample kept their significant / less significant status 
throughout the sample period. Although, potentially, banks could change their significant / less significant 
status, the number of significant supervised entities has been very stable throughout the sample period, 
because the ECB is committed “to ensure that high supervisory standards are applied consistently.” (https:// 
www. banki ngsup ervis ion. europa. eu/ banki ng/ list/ crite ria/ html/ index. en. html.). For these reasons, it is not 
possible to control for bank fixed effect in our empirical analysis, because there would be a multi-collinear-
ity problem with the TREAT dummy that identifies SSM supervised banks.
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dummy is statistically significant and positive indicating that, in general, BU was asso-
ciated with an increase in bank disclosure, consistent with our first research hypothesis. 
However, in three of the four disclosure categories (columns 1, 2 and 4) the coefficient on 
BU*Treat is statistically significant and negative, which suggests a reduction in disclosures 
related to risk management, risk exposure, and reassurances by SSM-supervised banks rel-
ative to these disclosures by nationally supervised banks following the onset of BU.14 This 
finding supports our second research hypothesis. In contrast, the coefficient on BU*Treat 
is positive and statistically significant regarding disclosures that reference the regulatory 
framework, indicating that SSM supervised banks increased their disclosures in this regard 
Table 2  Number of banks by 
country of origin
Orbis Bank Focus (Bureau van Dijk) database




























United Kingdom 25 11.11
Total 225 100.00
14 This finding should be interpreted in light of the fact that the parameter associated with the Treat dummy 
is positive. This result indicates that while SSM supervised banks were generally characterized by higher 
levels of disclosure, their disclosure practices worsened after the establishment of the BU compared to 
nationally supervised banks.”.
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relative to nationally supervised banks. What might explain the reduced disclosure by SSM 
supervised banks in three of the four disclosure categories? The finding is consistent with 
the principal-agent problem between the ECB and the national supervisors as suggested 
by Carletti et  al. (2021). This principal-agent problem appears to have resulted in ineffi-
ciencies with respect to the speed and completeness of the information flow between SSM 
supervised banks and the ECB. In this context, the information collection role played by 
NCAs in the current supervisory system in Europe results in a double principle-agent prob-
lem that causes inefficiencies in banking supervision, which are reflected in the disclosure 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics
The dependent variables were obtained by counting the number of occurrences of the words of our tailored 
dictionary in bank annual report. The bank financial statement data are from the Orbis Bank Focus (Bureau 
van Dijk) database. The Business disclosure index is from the World Bank “Doing Business” database. 
The corporate governance variables are from Bordex, Moody’s, Orbis Bank Focus (Bureau van Dijk) and 
Thomson Reuter Eikon
Observations Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables (full sample)
 Risk management 1575 0.000 1.000 −1.910 9.314
 Risk exposure 1575 0.000 1.000 −1.994 9.072
 Regulatory framework 1575 0.000 1.000 −1.725 8.133
 Reassurance 1575 0.000 1.000 −1.570 8.934
Dependent variables (treated banks)
 Risk management 525 0.148 0.913 −1.681 7.813
 Risk exposure 525 0.207 0.990 −1.634 7.575
 Regulatory framework 525 0.173 0.884 −1.582 6.179
 Reassurance 525 0.086 0.894 −1.570 6.935
Dependent variables (control group)
 Risk management 1050 −0.074 1.032 −1.910 9.314
 Risk exposure 1050 −0.103 0.989 −1.994 9.072
 Regulatory framework 1050 −0.086 1.042 −1.725 8.133
 Reassurance 1050 −0.043 1.046 −1.337 8.934
Independent variables (full sample)
 Bank equity to total assets (ETA) 1209 0.095 0.070 0.008 0.935
 Bank profitability (ROA) 1209 0.015 0.373 −2.205 2.923
 Bank loans to total assets (LOANS) 1209 0.117 0.136 0.003 0.697
 Off-balance sheet assets to total assets (OBS) 1209 0.184 0.328 0.000 2.520
 Customer deposits to total liabilities (CUST) 1209 0.528 0.246 0.000 0.967
 Big four auditor dummy (BIG4D) 1209 0.946 0.227 0.000 1.000
 Business disclosure index (WBBDI) 1209 6.330 2.206 1.000 10.000
 More than one national regulator dummy 
(NSAD)
1209 0.499 0.531 0.000 1.000
Corporate governance variables (robustness test)
 CEO’s age (CEOage) 1209 56.66 8.757 33.00 82.00
 CEO’s gender (CEOgen) 1209 0.046 0.211 0.000 1.000
 CEO’s duality (CEOdual) 1209 0.082 0.275 0.000 1.000
 Two-tier system (2TS) 1209 0.546 0.498 0.000 1.000
 Senior executives (SeniorExec) 1209 2.843 0.900 1.609 7.740
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practices of SSM supervised banks. The result also supports the view expressed by Gros 
and Schoenmaker (2014) that the institutional arrangements under BU are the result of a 
compromise of national authorities that do not want to give up their political power in favor 
of a centralized authority. These problems cause inefficiencies in bank supervision, which 
are reflected in bank disclosure practices.
Of the control variables, more disclosure is provided by banks that are less capital-
ized and less profitable and have a higher proportion of loans on total assets, which may 
be because banks are more vulnerable to market shocks and credit risk and wish to allay 
stakeholder fears about risk exposure. These findings are also in line with the idea that 
when financial institutions face difficult situations, their shareholders and investors are 
more willing to reduce the probability of banking crises by exercising market discipline 
(Nier and Baumann 2006). This market discipline role can be played only if adequate levels 
Table 5  Baseline difference-in-differences estimates: dependent variable—disclosure category
The dependent variable is a bank risk disclosure index for different categories of bank risk. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk management Risk exposure Regulatory framework Reassurance
Banking Union (BU) 0.2617*** 0.2397*** 0.1885*** 0.1764***
(0.0453) (0.0526) (0.0704) (0.0415)
SSM supervised bank (Treat) 0.2069*** 0.2979** 0.0702 0.1940**
(0.0286) (0.1454) (0.1204) (0.0881)
BU*Treat −0.1733*** −0.1543*** 0.1316** −0.1811***
(0.0388) (0.0448) (0.0632) (0.0317)
ETA −0.7145*** −0.7777** 0.1576 −0.0107
(0.2363) (0.3466) (0.1575) (0.3768)
ROA −0.1348** −0.1219*** −0.0324 −0.1213***
(0.0602) (0.0334) (0.0537) (0.0195)
Loans 0.2534** 0.1178 0.4009*** 0.5973**
(0.1109) (0.1599) (0.1303) (0.2602)
OBS 0.0248 0.0109 −0.1988*** −0.1276
(0.0415) (0.0527) (0.0456) (0.0967)
CUST −0.3699** −0.3056*** −0.0788 0.1419
(0.1539) (0.0765) (0.2174) (0.1104)
BIG4D 0.1461 0.2976** 0.4204** 0.0624
(0.1154) (0.1181) (0.1997) (0.1906)
WBBD 0.1897*** 0.1083* 0.1287*** 0.0855*
(0.0735) (0.0616) (0.0286) (0.0507)
NSAD −0.6204 −0.0620 −0.7346*** −0.0934
(0.4213) (0.1732) (0.2666) (0.2532)
Observations 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209
R2 0.302 0.365 0.373 0.287
Number of id 225 225 225 225
Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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of disclosure are provided.15 More specifically, the stakeholders of banks that are more 
vulnerable to credit risk and market shocks demand higher levels of disclosure aiming to 
reduce bank risk taking incentives by means of market discipline. Disclosure is also likely 
to be greater if banks are audited by one of the big four audit firms, because external audi-
tors play an important role in ensuring that shareholders and potential investors are ade-
quately informed about the risk exposure of the banks, and consequently they induce banks 
to provide higher levels of disclosure (Al Lawati et  al. 2021). In contrast, banks whose 
activities are funded by a larger share of customer deposits are associated with less disclo-
sure, probably reflecting the more stable nature of these source of funding and the reduced 
need to satisfy other stakeholders’ concerns about risk exposure. This finding is in line 
with the literature that provides evidence that the market discipline role played by deposi-
tors is not always fully effective in the banking industry (Berger and Turk-Ariss 2015), or 
less effective compared to that of investors and shareholders.
5.2  Robustness tests and additional analyses
We subject our key results to several robustness tests. First, a possible concern related to 
estimating Eq. (3) is that bank disclosure may have been affected by events that occurred 
before 2014 that are not captured in the specification. For example, banks might have 
changed their risk disclosure practices in response to the announcement of the BU in 2012 
that would take place rather than in response to its actual onset in 2014. In order to rule out 
this hypothesis we carry out a placebo test, widely used in previous studies that adopted the 
DiD identification strategy (e.g., Hertzberg et al. 2011; Balakrishnan et al. 2014; Schepens 
2016). In this test, we assume that the treatment took place in 2012 instead of 2014, and 
Table 6  Placebo test: dependent variable—disclosure category
The dependent variable is a bank risk disclosure index for different categories of bank risk. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk management Risk exposure Regulatory 
framework
Reassurance
BU fake 0.0397 −0.0405 0.0753* −0.0201
(0.0536) (0.0391) (0.0417) (0.0419)
Treat 0.3117* 0.3826 0.0659 0.3181**
(0.1764) (0.2874) (0.2021) (0.1461)
BU fake*Treat −0.0320 −0.0081 −0.0056 −0.0589
(0.0515) (0.0727) (0.0504) (0.0364)
Observations 586 586 586 586
R-squared 0.346 0.409 0.358 0.287
Number of id 205 205 205 205
Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
15 The literature suggests that higher levels of disclosure are generally associated with a decreased likeli-
hood of bank failure (Cordella and Yeyati 1998).
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estimate the effect of this fictitious BU. In order to center the time horizon of the analysis 
around the onset of the false treatment, we analyze the time period running from 2011 to 
2014 for this robustness test. The results are reported in Table 6 and show that the fictitious 
BU had no statistically significant effect on our variables of interest, supporting our finding 
that it was the onset of BU and the actual change in banking supervision arrangements that 
triggered the changes in banks’ disclosure practices.
Second, our results are subject to the limitation that our word categorization might not 
be the correct way to create our disclosure categories. To rule out this hypothesis, we use 
an alternative purely objective statistical approach to create our disclosure categories. Spe-
cifically, we use the k-means clustering algorithm proposed by Hartigan and Wong (1979) 
to aggregate the words according to the variability of their occurrences in bank annual 
reports.16 The result of this new categorization is a four-category clustering, which shares 
some common characteristics with our original categorization, supporting its reliability 
Table 7  Relative percentages of 
the words in common between 
each category and cluster
The bold values show the percentage of words in common between 









Cluster 1 28 26 20 26
Cluster 2 0 100 0 0
Cluster 3 17 25 28 30
Cluster 4 21 6 73 0
Table 8  Cluster analysis
The dependent variable is a bank risk disclosure index for different categories of bank risk. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively
Dependent variable Cluster 1 risk 
management
Cluster 2 risk exposure Cluster 3 reassurance Cluster 4 
regulatory 
framework
BU 0.3102*** 0.2339*** 0.2397*** 0.1864***
(0.0608) (0.0449) (0.0532) (0.0552)
Treat 0.3286*** 0.3137*** 0.1685*** 0.1871***
(0.0341) (0.1197) (0.0554) (0.0720)
BU*Treat −0.0934*** −0.1435*** −0.1497*** 0.1095**
(0.0355) (0.0415) (0.0278) (0.0556)
Observations 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209
R-squared 0.292 0.399 0.349 0.361
Number of id 225 225 225 225
Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
16 See Krink et al. (2007) for insights on the k-means cluster methodology in a banking context.
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and accuracy. Table 7 reports the relative proportion of words in common between each 
k-means cluster and our original categorization. The results indicate that a high proportion 
of the words of each cluster belong to our risk disclosure categories (28%, 100%, 30%, and 
73% for clusters 1 to 4, respectively after normalization), suggesting that our original cat-
egorization is reliable. We check whether the clusters identified by the k-means approach 
behave similarly to our original categories by running regressions substituting our origi-
nal categories with the k-means clusters. These results are reported in Table 8 and show 
that for each cluster, the regressions are qualitatively unchanged from those of our baseline 
models. Hence, we can conclude that our original categorization is reliable and accurate as 
it is validated by an objective statistical methodology.
Third, our results might be affected by the choice of the weights assigned to each word 
of the four categories we employ. As explained, the term mowCat 1 in Eq. (1) is the mean 
of the relative occurrences of the words belonging to the first category. It is implicit that 
all words have the same weight equal to unity. To test the robustness of our results, we use 
principal component analysis to aggregate the occurrences of the words of each category 
into a single variable.17 For each category of our dictionary, we use the first principal com-
ponent as the dependent variable of our regressions. The results reported in Table 9 are 
consistent with the risk disclosure regressions proposed in our baseline models.
Fourth, we deal with two potential shortcomings of the DiD methodology that might 
cast doubt on our baseline results. First, one of the most severe assumptions of the DiD 
procedure is that the control group is a valid counterfactual of the treatment. Even though 
our sample selection approach should guarantee that our control group (nationally super-
vised banks) is similar to the treatment one (SSM-supervised banks), we test the robustness 
of our model to this assumption by selecting a restricted control group using propensity 
Table 9  Principal components analysis
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively
Dependent variable: Risk management Risk exposure Regulatory framework Reassurance
BU 0.3102*** 0.2339*** 0.1859*** 0.2397***
(0.0608) (0.0449) (0.0552) (0.0532)
Treat 0.3286*** 0.3137*** 0.1868*** 0.1685***
(0.0341) (0.1197) (0.0720) (0.0554)
BU*Treat −0.0934*** −0.1435*** 0.1120** −0.1497***
(0.0355) (0.0415) (0.0556) (0.0278)
Observations 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209
R-squared 0.292 0.399 0.361 0.349
Number of id 225 225 225 225
Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
17 Principal component analysis is a statistical technique that converts a set of variables into a smaller set of 
linearly uncorrelated variables, named principal components, which preserve the information and structure 
of the original variables (Cumming and Wooff 2007). This methodology has been widely used in banking 
and accounting studies (Larcker et al. 2007; Ludvigson and Ng 2007; Carlson and Wheelock 2018).
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score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) in which the predicted probability (propen-
sity score) of being selected as a SSM-supervised bank is computed by estimating a simple 
probit model. We use bank capitalization (ETA) and profitability (ROA) to match SSM-
supervised banks with nationally supervised banks using the Kernel matching approach 
(Heckman et al., 1998).18 The results of the propensity score matching difference-in-dif-
ferences estimation are reported in Table 10 and are consistent with those of our baseline 
models, supporting the robustness of our results. In Table 11, we compare the differences 
between treated and untreated banks for these two variables. It emerges that these differ-
ences are statistically insignificant, further supporting the effectiveness of our propensity 
score matching methodology. The second potential shortcoming of the DiD methodology 
Table 10  Propensity score matching
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively
Dependent variable Risk management Risk exposure Regulatory 
framework
Reassurance
BU 0.2465*** 0.2151*** 0.1734** 0.1610***
(0.0452) (0.0510) (0.0702) (0.0401)
Treat 0.2233*** 0.3446** 0.0428 0.2303**
(0.0509) (0.1630) (0.1368) (0.1063)
BU*Treat −0.1704*** −0.1492*** 0.1458** −0.1752***
(0.0401) (0.0514) (0.0655) (0.0348)
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070
R-squared 0.292 0.367 0.391 0.292
Number of id 200 200 200 200
Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 11  Comparison of bank specific characteristics for treated and untreated banks after propensity score 
matching
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively
Variables Treated Untreated Difference 
between 
meansMean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
ETA 0.0897 0.1138 0.0905 0.0495 −0.0007*
ROA 0.0179 0.2767 0.0169 0.4051 0.001**
18 We select the variables ETA and ROA to match treated and untreated banks for two main reasons: First, 
capitalization and profitability are considered amongst the most important determinants of risk disclosure in 
the banking industry (Helbok and Wagner, 2006; Linsley et al., 2006). Second, the selection of additional 
control variables in the propensity score matching regression would lead to a significant decrease in the 
number of observations, thereby undermining the generalizability of our findings to the whole population. 
According to Shipman et  al. (2017), this problem should be avoided when performing propensity score 
matching.
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is that it might suffer from serial correlation issues (Bertrand et al. 2004). We address this 
concern by collapsing the time series information into the pre- and post- 2014 period, tak-
ing the means of the data of these two time periods separately, and then repeating the DiD 
regression at the averaged level.19 The results are reported in Table 12 and are qualitatively 
Table 12  Addressing serial correlation concerns
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk manage-
ment disclosure
Risk exposure References to the 
regulatory framework
Reassuring disclosure
BU 0.3212*** 0.2236*** 0.2551*** 0.2094***
(0.0079) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0143)
Treat 0.1489*** 0.2673*** 0.0157 0.1843
(0.0200) (0.0132) (0.0252) (0.1238)
BU * Treat −0.0878*** −0.0170*** 0.0742*** −0.0376***
(0.0062) (0.0058) (0.0232) (0.0053)
Observations 450 450 450 450
R-squared 0.313 0.430 0.389 0.317
Number of id 225 225 225 225
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fig. 1  Parallel trend—Risk management category
19 This procedure for dealing with potential serial correlation is suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004).
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unchanged from our baseline. Hence, our results are still robust after controlling for serial 
correlation issues.
Fifth, in order to guarantee that the results of our difference-in-differences strategy 
are reliable and not affected by other concurrent policies, the treatment and the control 
group must satisfy the parallel trend assumption in the pre-treatment period. Figures 1,2, 
3, 4 show the correlation coefficients of the of the mean values of the disclosure indexes 
of SSM supervised banks and nationally supervised entities in the pre-treatment period. 
The correlation coefficients are high for all disclosure categories (greater or equal to 0.7) 
and visual inspection indicates that the trends of the disclosure indexes are parallel. Thus, 
Fig. 2  Parallel trend—Risk exposure category
Fig. 3  Parallel trend—Regulatory framework
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the control group of nationally supervised banks appears to be a valid counterfactual of 
the treatment group (SSM supervised banks).20In order to formally test the parallel trend 
assumption, we draw upon the approach proposed by Frankel et  al. (2020) and Ahmed 
et  al. (2020). Specifically, we added dummy variables that identify each year before the 
establishment of the BU, and the interactions between these indicator variables and the 
variable Treat. Formally, we used the following model:
where dummy_2012, dummy_2013 and dummy_2014 are the dummy variables that 
identify years 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. The results of this test are reported in 
Table 13. First, for all parameters (with one single exception in column 1) there is no sig-
nificant differential trend between treated and untreated banks before the establishment of 
the BU. Second, in order to compare the differences between treated and untreated banks 
before and after the banking union, we perform t-tests to compare the magnitude of the 
parameter associated to the interaction dummy BU*Treat (β1), with the average of β5, β6 
and β7. The results are reported at the bottom of Table 13. They are all statistically different 
at conventional levels, suggesting that there is a significant differential decrease in disclo-
sure for SSM supervised banks after the establishment of the BU. These results further 
support the robustness of our baseline model.
(4)




+ 2 ⋅ dummy_2012 + 3 ⋅ dummy_2013
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Con + CFE + ijt
Fig. 4  Parallel trend—Reassurance
20 We carried out, but do not report, two further robustness tests that support the reliability of our results. 
First, we excluded non-eurozone countries from our analysis, and second, we computed the regression esti-
mates using only the words ‘risk’ and ‘uncertain’, as they are considered particularly important when it 
comes to create a quantitative measure of language (Tetlock.et al. 2008). The results are available from the 
authors upon request.
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Finally, we examine the robustness of our results to the inclusion in Eq. (3) of corpo-
rate governance variables, which might affect the results for two reasons. First, by add-
ing additional control variables, we reduce possible concerns related to omitted variable 
bias that could affect our econometric model. Second, previous studies provide evidence 
that corporate governance plays an important role in bank risk taking (Beltratti and Stulz 
2012; Minton et al 2014) and disclosure (Forker 1992). Hence, we extend our empirical 
model by adding the following variables: (i) the CEO’s age in years (CEOage); (ii) CEO’s 
gender (CEOgen), which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is female and zero 
otherwise; (iii) whether the CEO also holds the post of chairman (CEOdual), which is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the bank and zero otherwise; 
(iv) whether the bank has a two-tier executive board (2TS), which is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the board structure includes supervisors and managers and zero otherwise; and 
the natural logarithm of the number of senior executives (directors and managers) in the 
bank (SeniorExec). The sources of these variables are Bordex and Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
The results of the regressions are reported in Table 14. The signs and statistical signifi-
cance of the coefficients on the main variable of interest (BU and BU*Treat) are qualita-
tively unchanged from our baseline model, supporting the robustness of our results. As for 
Table 13  Test of parallel trend assumption
The dependent variable is a bank risk disclosure index for different categories of bank risk. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk management Risk exposure Regulatory framework Reassurance
BU*Treat (β1) −0.2028*** −0.1896*** 0.1542*** −0.2419***
(0.0340) (0.0401) (0.0399) (0.0251)
Dummy_2012 (β2) 0.0271** 0.0276* −0.0060 −0.0113
(0.0121) (0.0147) (0.0137) (0.0167)
Dummy_2013 (β3) −0.0202** −0.0731 0.0171 −0.0952***
(0.0087) (0.0728) (0.0138) (0.0104)
Dummy_2014 (β4) −0.0106 −0.0548*** 0.0737 −0.0045
(0.0160) (0.0176) (0.0725) (0.0122)
Dummy_2012*Treat (β5) −0.0265 0.0245 −0.0918 0.0646
(0.0177) (0.1051) (0.0986) (0.0324)
Dummy_2013*Treat (β6) −0.0103 −0.0245 −0.0157 −0.0350
(0.0140) (0.0251) (0.0658) (0.0360)
Dummy_2014*Treat (β7) 0.1290* −0.0387 0.1046 −0.0311
(0.0750) (0.0340) (0.0727) (0.0343)
β1 – (β5 + β6 + β7) / 3 −0.2335** −0.1767*** 0.1552* −0.2414**
H0: β1 – (β5 + β6 + β7) / 3 t = −5.7951 t = −11.3044 t = 3.3240 t = −9.0776
Observations 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209
R-squared 0.347 0.415 0.377 0.298
Number of id 225 225 225 225
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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the effects of the corporate governance variables, CEOage has a positive and statistically 
significant effect in three out of four regressions, in line with previous studies that found 
Table 14  Effects of banking Union on Bank disclosure—including corporate governance variables
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk management Risk exposure Regulatory framework Reassurance
BU 0.2341*** 0.2318*** 0.1527** 0.1577***
(0.0404) (0.0524) (0.0723) (0.0392)
Treat 0.1136** 0.2483* 0.0177 0.1346
(0.0548) (0.1270) (0.1337) (0.0825)
BU*Treat −0.1774*** −0.1587*** 0.1209** −0.1831***
(0.0374) (0.0446) (0.0613) (0.0335)
ETA −0.7743*** −0.8134*** 0.1329 −0.0452
(0.2260) (0.3120) (0.1460) (0.3611)
ROA −0.1297** −0.1208*** −0.0261 −0.1176***
(0.0617) (0.0326) (0.0550) (0.0203)
LOANS 0.2444** 0.1333 0.3939*** 0.5668**
(0.1107) (0.1470) (0.1410) (0.2638)
OBS −0.0260 −0.0386 −0.2187*** −0.1541
(0.0490) (0.0634) (0.0500) (0.1019)
CUST −0.3798*** −0.2859*** −0.1059 0.1128
(0.1472) (0.0716) (0.1937) (0.1195)
BIG4D 0.0261 0.1859 0.3642* 0.0095
(0.0819) (0.1426) (0.1926) (0.2120)
WBBD 0.1821** 0.1071* 0.1195*** 0.0811
(0.0717) (0.0625) (0.0255) (0.0500)
NSAD −0.3827 0.0353 −0.5051* −0.0023
(0.4087) (0.1758) (0.3051) (0.2500)
CEOage 0.0123** 0.0034 0.0159** 0.0087*
(0.0055) (0.0050) (0.0068) (0.0049)
CEOgen 0.0915 0.1281 0.3403*** 0.0573
(0.1085) (0.1451) (0.1282) (0.1780)
CEOdual −0.1879** −0.2720* 0.1099 0.1598
(0.0772) (0.1510) (0.1747) (0.2313)
2TS 0.3134 0.2905 0.1834 0.1178
(0.3110) (0.2527) (0.2368) (0.2155)
SeniorExec 0.1951*** 0.2182*** 0.1022 0.1169**
(0.0757) (0.0727) (0.1077) (0.0518)
Observations 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209
R-squared 0.347 0.415 0.373 0.298
Number of id 225 225 225 225
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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that the age of the CEO is an important determinant of disclosure (Marquez-Illescas et al. 
2019). These results show that older CEOs provide higher levels of disclosure, because of 
their higher experience that enables them to adopt more effective and risk-oriented disclo-
sure practices. CEOgen is positively related with disclosure, showing that women CEOs 
are more prone to provide higher levels of disclosure. This supports recent research sug-
gesting that female CEOs are more risk averse (Faccio et  al. 2016; Martin et  al. 2009). 
However, it is necessary to be cautious in the interpretation of this effect, because it is 
statistically significant only in one out of four regressions. CEOdual is negatively and sig-
nificantly related with two risk disclosure variables. This result shows that when CEOs act 
also as chairmen in banking institutions, the levels of disclosure are lower. This finding is 
in line with the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), given that CEO duality implies 
higher levels of power for the CEO, who may decide to provide low levels of disclosure, 
because he/she is not interested in reducing information asymmetries with their sharehold-
ers. Lastly, SeniorExec is positively and significantly associated with disclosure in three 
out of four regressions. suggesting that more experienced directors and managers contrib-
ute to increasing the level of disclosure (Adawi and Rwegasira 2011).
We also carry out additional analyses taking into consideration interaction terms 
between our variables of interest and selected explanatory variables for two main reasons. 
First, to test whether these variables may affect the relationship between BU and disclo-
sure. Second, because, by including additional variables in our regression model, we can 
further test the robustness of our baseline results.
Specifically, we investigate into the following aspects: (i) how bank profitability influ-
ences the relationship between BU and disclosure; (ii) how the location of banks in GIPSI 
(Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland) countries influences the relationship between 
BU and disclosure; (iii) how CEO duality (i.e. the CEO is also the Chairman of the 
Table 15  Interaction between BU and ROA
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk management Risk exposure Regulatory framework Reassurance
BU 0.2493*** 0.2460*** 0.1594** 0.1669***
(0.0409) (0.0527) (0.0724) (0.0389)
Treat 0.1225** 0.2578** 0.0219 0.1403*
(0.0550) (0.1256) (0.1334) (0.0819)
BU*Treat −0.1885*** −0.1700*** 0.1157* −0.1892***
(0.0337) (0.0436) (0.0604) (0.0326)
BU*ROA −2.1118*** −1.9856*** −0.9726*** −1.3012**
(0.5835) (0.5402) (0.2556) (0.5454)
Observations 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209
R-squared 0.345 0.415 0.372 0.297
Number of id 225 225 225 225
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 16  Interaction between BU and GIPSI
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk management Risk exposure Regulatory 
framework
Reassurance
BU 0.2134*** 0.2152*** 0.1503** 0.1488***
(0.0343) (0.0447) (0.0744) (0.0343)
Treat 0.1199* 0.2546** 0.0183 0.1372*
(0.0640) (0.1207) (0.1343) (0.0781)
BU*Treat −0.2000*** −0.1790*** 0.1186* −0.1911***
(0.0370) (0.0395) (0.0640) (0.0354)
BU*GIPSI 0.1292* 0.1017** 0.0143 0.0553
(0.0669) (0.0498) (0.0288) (0.0462)
Observations 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209
R-squared 0.348 0.414 0.373 0.298
Number of id 225 225 225 225
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 17  Interaction between CEO duality and BU*Treat
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk management Risk exposure Regulatory 
framework
Reassurance
BU 0.2339*** 0.2318*** 0.1524** 0.1578***
(0.0403) (0.0525) (0.0723) (0.0393)
Treat 0.1122** 0.2465* 0.0155 0.1320
(0.0557) (0.1280) (0.1327) (0.0850)
BU*Treat −0.1693*** −0.1462*** 0.1322** −0.1549***
(0.0297) (0.0498) (0.0550) (0.0422)
BU*Treat*CEOdual −0.0985 −0.1596** −0.1414 −0.3720**
(0.1289) (0.0807) (0.1524) (0.1877)
Observations 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209
R-squared 0.347 0.414 0.371 0.295
Number of id 225 225 225 225
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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financial institution) affects the relationship between the interaction dummy (BU*Treat) 
and bank disclosure. The results are reported in the Table 15, 16 and 17. Table 15 shows 
that the interaction term between BU and ROA is negatively and significantly associated 
with each of the four dependent variables. This finding means that the relationship between 
BU and disclosure is influenced by bank profitability. In particular, the positive effect of the 
BU on bank disclosure is stronger for less profitable banks and weaker for highly profitable 
banks. This result is important because the disclosures provided by less profitable banks 
are particularly relevant for investors and stakeholders that are interested in understanding 
the reasons of their low level of profitability. Table 16 reports the effect of the interaction 
between the BU indicator variable and a dummy variable that identifies the banks that are 
located in the GIPSI countries. Shambaugh (2012) uses this acronym to indicate the five 
most troubled economies of the Eurozone, namely Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland. 
Previous studies have argued that the effect of the BU in GIPSI countries might be different 
from the other European countries because of their high levels of sovereign debt (Avignone 
et al. 2020). In order to investigate into this aspect, we analyze if the location of banks in 
GIPSI countries affect the way the BU has influenced bank disclosure. The results show 
that the interaction between BU and the GIPSI dummy variable is positively and signifi-
cantly associated with two risk disclosure categories. This finding support the idea that the 
effect of the banking union has been different for these countries, and in particular the posi-
tive influence of the BU on disclosure has been stronger in these countries. Similarly to the 
results obtained in the previous regression, also in this case the disclosure has increased 
for those banks that were in a more difficult situation, and in particular for those banks that 
are located in troubled countries characterized by high levels of sovereign debt.21 Finally, 
in Table 17 we report on the interaction between BU, Treat and CEO duality. The results 
show that for those banks in which the CEO is also the Chairman of the bank (CEO dual-
ity), the negative effect of the banking union on the disclosure of SSM supervised banks 
is stronger. This effect is statistically significant for two out of four disclosure categories. 
This finding is consistent with previous literature that shows that CEO duality has a nega-
tive effect on disclosure (Gul and Leung 2004). The hypothesis that concentrated decision 
making power, and consequently CEO duality, may negatively influence board’s oversight, 
including disclosure policies is grounded in agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983). This is 
because CEO duality and its associated concentrated decision making power could reduce 
the ability of the board to exercise effective control. Thus, this mechanism played an 
important role in determining the effect of BU on the disclosure practices of SSM super-
vised banks. In Tables 15, 16 and 17, the results of the main variables of interest (BU and 
BU*TREAT) are qualitatively unchanged from our baseline regressions and they are still 
statistically significant at conventional levels. These findings further validate the robustness 
of our baseline results.
21 We build upon the evidence that the effect of the BU is different in the most indebted European countries 
by performing an additional analysis on the least indebted countries. The results (not reported) show that 
the negative effect of the banking union on the risk disclosure of SSM supervised banks is less strong in the 
least indebted European countries. This finding provides additional evidence that the level of sovereign debt 
of the countries has played an important role in shaping the relationship between the BU and bank disclo-
sure practices. The results of these analyses are available from the authors upon request.
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6  Conclusions
This paper investigated the impact of BU on bank risk disclosure in a sample of 225 
European banks, 75 of which were supervised under the SSM once BU was introduced. 
It employed content analysis techniques to construct a dictionary designed to assess four 
categories of disclosure in bank financial statements together with a Difference-in-Differ-
ences estimation methodology in which banks supervised under the SSM act as the treat-
ment group and banks supervised by the national supervisor act as the control group. The 
main hypotheses underlying the analysis were that the onset of BU would increase risk 
disclosure by all banks and that the additional requirements of the SSM would increase 
risk disclosure by SSM supervised banks (treated entities) relative to that by other banks. 
The paper reports two key results that are robust to a battery of tests. First, BU had a pos-
itive impact on bank disclosure overall—i.e., bank disclosure in a number of categories 
increased following the onset of BU. Second, in line with our second research hypothesis, 
there is evidence that disclosure by SSM-supervised banks worsened relative to that of 
nationally supervised banks. The latter result likely reflects the shortcoming of a two-tier 
supervisory system in which the SSM supervisor—the ECB—is dependent on national 
regulators for the supply of information. This arrangement likely gives rise to inefficiencies 
with respect to the speed and completeness of the information flow between SSM super-
vised banks and the ECB, especially as the interest of the ECB and the national regulators 
are unlikely to always converge. These inefficiencies, already identified by other authors 
(Carletti et  al. 2015, 2021; Gros and Schoenmaker 2014), might affect bank risk disclo-
sure practices, resulting in the lower level of disclosure observed in our empirical analy-
sis. In additional analyses, we also find that the overall positive effect of the BU on bank 
disclosure is stronger for less profitable banks and in the most troubled economies of the 
Eurozone, while the negative effect on SSM supervised banks is stronger if bank CEOs act 
also as Chairman. These results show that bank specific and country characteristics play 
an important role in determining the impact of banking supervision on bank disclosure 
practices.
We acknowledge that our paper is potentially affected by a caveat: the results might 
be partially driven by other competing regulations occurred in 2014, different from the 
establishment of the BU and its associated rules. However, to our best knowledge, the 
only regulation that could affect our results is the already mentioned 2014 Basel III Pil-
lar 3 disclosures requirement. In this regard, it is important to notice that this regulation 
has imposed disclosure requirements exclusively in the Pillar 3 disclosure report, which 
is provided separately from the annual financial reports of European banks (Scannella and 
Polizzi 2018). Given that we did not include the Pillar 3 disclosure report in our content 
analysis, the results of the empirical investigation should not be affected by this regulation. 
The main policy implication of our results is that efforts are necessary to improve disclo-
sure by SSM-supervised banks to the same extent as that of nationally supervised banks. 
One way to achieve this goal would be have SSM-supervised banks report directly to the 
ECB.
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